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1 Introduction 
If international NGOs (INGOs) are to successfully ‘measure’
or assess outcomes and impacts of empowerment and
accountability (E&A) programmes, they need to shift their
attention from indicators and data collection tools to a
more holistic approach to thinking about appropriate
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) strategies and systems. If
they are to lead or commission evaluations and impact
assessments that both generate evidence of the desired
quality, and are consistent with their organisations’
participatory values, they need to start developing
monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) strategies at the
programme planning and budgeting stage. 
This CDI Practice Paper is based on a scoping and analysis
of INGO evaluation practice commissioned by CARE UK,
Christian Aid, Plan UK and World Vision UK using funding
from their DFID Programme Partnership Agreements
(PPAs). We reviewed a range of E&A evaluation
documents relating to 16 programmes and projects,
varying from a randomised control trial designed and
implemented by academics, through multi-country INGO
governance portfolios, to modest country office pilots of
participatory M&E for internal learning.1 In doing so, we
also synthesised and brought to bear lessons from recent
MEL literature on the INGOs’ practice.
The final product was not, as originally envisaged by the
INGOs, a selection of ‘best practice’ tools or indicators,
but a paper on improving the evaluability of INGO E&A
programmes (Shutt and McGee 2012). From this, we have
derived two CDI Practice Papers: 
 the present paper reviews, in turn, the state of MEL
debates, their implications for INGOs and emerging
practice, a summary of guidelines and a brief
conclusion; and
 CDI Practice Paper 01 Annex sets out in full detail the
guidelines summarised briefly in this paper.
A word on terminology. Throughout the two CDI Practice
Papers, rather than using the terms ‘measurement’ or
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‘impact evaluation’, we have tended to use ‘assessment’
and ‘exploration’. This is partly to avoid the strictures of
the narrowest definition of ‘impact evaluation’, to which a
small proportion of donors and evaluators subscribe,
where the most ‘robust’ methodologies are used to
explore causality as a basis for evidence for influencing
policy and spending decisions. And it is partly because our
view of the field suggests that sometimes ‘assessment’ and
‘exploration’ are more accurate and appropriate ways than
‘measurement’ to describe what is being done, and indeed
what can be done, in the context of E&A programmes. 
2 The state of MEL debates
While international development NGOs and their southern
partners are eager to demonstrate their effectiveness, in
the 2010s they are struggling to respond to ever more
stringent requirements from their institutional donors to
demonstrate the impact of their activities. These
requirements arise from the exigencies of the results
agenda and evidence-based turn in aid policy, in the UK,
USA and other OECD donor countries. Development
INGOs encounter these challenges in designing and
implementing their internal M&E systems, and also in
commissioning external, independent evaluations of their
programmes funded by institutional donors. 
Over decades, INGOs’ impact claims have tended to err
on the side of vagueness, and have blurred the fact that
the makers of these claims were highly positioned actors
acting in the interest of their own organisations,
constituencies, sector and marginalised target groups, as
well as, or more than, in the interests of methodological
rigour. INGO staff are now keenly aware of the need to
achieve rigour in assessments of their own impact, and of
the risks entailed in impact evaluation that smacks of
hubris or self-justification. 
Thematically speaking, the field where INGOs – and their
official aid and philanthropic donor agencies too – are
having most trouble is in the field of governance
programming. This is hardly surprising. The governance
field is broadly regarded as a ‘complex’ one for
programming, frequently contrasted with fields such as
malaria prevention or vaccination where – providing
donors are supporting direct delivery models – results can
be counted and attributed as unambiguously as beans.
(Whether the bean count gives a full account of change
being achieved by programmes that aim to develop the
long-term capacity of health systems to deliver
vaccinations, which usually also involve messy governance
components, is quite another question.) 
A study was commissioned by DFID’s Evaluation
Department in 2011 with the specific mandate of
‘broadening the range of designs and methods for impact
evaluation’. It was born of a rising concern that while
experimental impact assessment methods imported from
the medical sciences were catching on and spreading across
the development and aid fields, DFID and its partners, peers
and grantees were lacking evaluation methods that fitted
comfortably with a growing proportion of their
programmes. Particularly noted was the lack of suitable
approaches for assessing the impact of governance
programming in such sub-fields as ‘strengthening democracy
and accountability; accountable and responsive government;
security and conflict prevention; combating gender-based
violence; citizen empowerment and community action’.2
The DFID study coincided in time with the first large-scale
review of the effectiveness and impact of accountability and
transparency initiatives, commissioned by the T/A Initiative.3
Also around the same time, several researchers and
practitioners in the development and aid fields published
critical, thought-provoking, questing work about the
challenges of assessing impact in governance programmes
or what many of them called ‘complex’ programmes, in
which they include governance programmes (Ramalingam
et al. 2008; Hughes and Hutchings 2011; Roche and Kelly
2012; Barder and Ramalingam 2012). 
These sources show a remarkable degree of consensus on
the nature of the ‘problem’ at hand and largely concur on
a set of key points which are highly relevant to this CDI
Practice Paper.
Firstly, they agree, we are in the grip of an ‘Evidence-Based
Policy Movement’ (a phrase used by Stern et al.). This has
thrown into sharp relief the generally weak state of
evaluation and impact assessment within the development
sector. Particular weaknesses identified relate to evaluation
designs and the quality of analysis, which have tended to
overlook the importance of context and power relations
that are of particular concern in E&A interventions.
Acknowledgement of the weak state of current practice
and concerns about improving it have moved evaluation
debates beyond discussions of differences between
quantitative and qualitative or participatory methods.
Arguably, in the past a focus on methods has diverted
attention from deeper and more significant differences
among the evaluation community. These are better
described in terms of ‘causal wars’ and are both political
and methodological in nature (Roche and Kelly 2012). Those
determined to attribute impacts to their interventions have
tended to favour experimental and quasi-experimental
evaluation designs. This is because such designs are believed
to be superior when it comes to demonstrating that
development initiatives ‘cause’ impacts within short-term
timeframes and thus tend to fit with political demands for
quick evidence of results. On the other hand, those who
see development agencies playing a relatively small role in
complex, long-term social change processes have been
driven by different imperatives. They tend to be less
concerned about establishing causal relationships and
demonstrating that a certain outcome can be attributed to
a particular intervention, and more interested in using
approaches that are contextually embedded and that
encourage learning by different stakeholders. All too often
these latter approaches have been insufficiently critical and
confounded by weak methodological design.4
The recent contributions to the debate, particularly Stern
et al. (2012), comment on an increased willingness by
practitioners who have previously held quite different
positions to accept the need for more pluralist designs
and methods. They distinguish usefully between evaluation
designs and methods; see Box 1. 
The same methods can of course be deployed within
different designs. However, choices between different
methods are driven by design, because it is the objective
and questions of the research or evaluation that influence
researchers’ and evaluators’ ability to assess ‘causal
inference’ and attribution or contribution, rather than the
methods. Underpinning different designs and design
decisions are different epistemologies and methodological
paradigms, which are based on different premises or
‘belief systems’ about the nature of knowledge and truth
claims. While a detailed discussion of these lies beyond
the scope of this CDI Practice Paper, it is important to
note that such deep, often buried, underlying ‘belief
systems’ have profound implications for practice. 
Tensions between ‘learning’ and ‘donor accountability’
evaluation objectives are well established in the literature.6
A-theoretical experimental and quasi-experimental designs
that aim to answer the question ‘Did the programme
work?’ without exploring how, why, and in what contexts
are often better suited to evaluations trying to
demonstrate accountability to donors, particularly donors
who are spending tax-payers’ money, rather than fostering
learning. In practice, the distinctions are somewhat more
complex. In an evidence-based policy paradigm,
experimental methods are often used judiciously for the
impact evaluation of a small proportion of donor
programmes, to inform learning about whether policy
approaches ‘work’ or not. The increasing use of hybrid
designs that integrate programme designs based on
theories of change, with experimental evaluation designs,
means that many offer more learning possibilities about
how and why impact does or does not result from
interventions than hitherto assumed. 
New definitions and understandings of ‘gold standards’ in
terms of rigour in evaluating development initiatives are
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Box 1 Difference between methodological
‘design’ and ‘methods’
Design is defined as the overarching logic for evaluations
that includes: evaluation questions, theory used to
analyse data, data and use of data.
Methods are defined as approaches to data collection
and measurement tools and statistical analysis.
(Adapted from Stern et al. 2012)
Table 1 Evaluation designs and basis for causality claims5
Evaluation design approaches Basis for claims of causality 
Experimental Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs), quasi- Counterfactuals; the co-presence of cause and effect 
experiments, natural experiments
Statistical including descriptive statistical modelling and Correlation between cause and effect or between variables
longitudinal studies
Theory based Using a theory of change (ToC), process tracing, Identification or confirmation of causal processes or chains and 
contribution analysis and impact pathways supporting factors and mechanisms at work in the context. May 
include some statistical analysis
Case based Interpretive – naturalistic, grounded theory or ethnography Comparison across and within combinations of causal factors
Participatory Participatory evaluation for empowerment. Validation by participants that their actions and experienced effects 
are caused by the programme. 
Agency-led Learning by doing, collaborative action research Involves adoption, customisation and commitment to a goal
Synthesis Meta analysis, narrative or realistic-based Accumulation and aggregation within a number of perspectives 
synthesis (Pawson 2002) above
(Adapted from Stern et al. 2012)
coming to light as evaluators recognise the importance of
evaluation designs and the potential of non-experimental
designs to explore causal mechanisms. What defines a
‘gold standard for impact assessment’ is no longer the
scope it offers for establishing causal relationships, but
rather how appropriate the methodological design is given
the emphases in the questions asked (do they emphasise
questions of whether, how much, or how cause led to
effect?), and the attributes of the programme in question.
There is now greater awareness of trade-offs between
the scope and complexity of programmes on the one
hand, and the confidence with which causality can be
established, on the other. If these lessons are to be
usefully applied to practice, challenges need anticipating
and mitigating at programme design stage, not at
evaluation stage. Since so many of the lessons relate to
programme design, by the ex-post evaluation stage it is
too late to incorporate many of them. 
Several of the broadly like-minded sources we cite above
note the tensions between complex programme
environments and demands for neatly demonstrated
results. Barder and Ramalingam (2012) go a useful step
further than lamenting these tensions. They argue that
there is no contradiction between recognising complexity
in the programme environment, and focusing on and
demonstrating results. In fact, they hold, ‘Complexity
provides a powerful reason for pursuing the results agenda,
but it has to be done in ways which reflect the context’.
They present Ramalingam’s ‘complexity-aware approach to
results’, based on the proposition that we need to get a
better handle on the nature of the programme in question,
the interventions being implemented (including the
complexity of relationships within them), and the context of
the intervention – which affects not only what change is
possible, but also the feasibility of evaluation.
Barder and Ramalingam go on: ‘This gives us three
dimensions – ranging from simple problems and
interventions in stable contexts through to complex
interventions in diverse and dynamic contexts’ (italics added).
The italicised phrase closely fits E&A programmes which,
by dint of their objectives, are often developed for and
unfold in a range of governance contexts characterised by
polarised power relations and fluid and unpredictable
sociopolitical dynamics. They continue: 
‘Down in the bottom left-hand corner are simple
problems and stable settings. This is where ‘Plan and
Control’ makes most sense. Traditional results-based
management approach, the more conventional unit-
cost based value [sic] for money analyses and
randomised control trials work especially well… At the
top right we have complex problems, complex
interventions in diverse and dynamic settings. (A lot of
donor work in fragile states and post conflict societies
are in this corner.) Here the goal is ‘Managing
Turbulence’. In this space, everything is so unpredictable
and fluid that planning, action and assessment are
effectively fused together… In between is what we
have called the zone of ‘Adaptive Management’. Here
we may find ourselves managing a variety of
combinations of our three axes. In our view, the vast
majority of development interventions sit in this middle
ground’ (Barder and Ramalingam 2012).
Contributions like Barder and Ramalingam’s make it
legitimate and appropriate to recognise that many aspects
of development and humanitarian programme contexts
are beyond the control of an INGO programme or,
indeed, any other kind of purposeful intervention; and that
complex problems which require complex interventions,
such as attempts to redress power imbalances and get
historically unaccountable governments to become more
accountable, compound this difficulty. This helps guide
choices of evaluation approach according to a common-
sense analysis of what we can and cannot purposefully
manage or measure.
3 Implications for INGOs and emerging
practice
Bearing in mind the evidence of current practice that we
analysed during our scoping, what do these general MEL
debates imply for INGOs implementing E&A programmes?
Resist ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to E&A MEL In a
world which, many development practitioners agree, is
messy and non-linear, it is important to avoid both
reductionist, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to assessing
results and excessive pessimism about possibilities for
learning and adaptation. This points us towards a more
adaptive approach, and to experimenting with hybrid
designs (including elements of thinking from theory-based
approaches, participatory and case study designs) to monitor
emergent progress and adapt to a changing context. Real-
time learning is essential to check the relative effectiveness
of different approaches and scaling down or stopping those
that are ineffective (Barder and Ramalingam 2012).
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Think about how social change actually happens, with or
without external interventions Barder and Ramalingam’s
various dimensions resonate with Reeler’s (2007) models of
social change, derived from extensive practice and systematic
field observation: emergent change, transformative change
and projectable change. ‘Projectable change’ leaps out at
development practitioners as what we attempt to do,
often unrealistically. ‘Emergent change’ chimes with the
emergent and uncontrollable qualities of the realities we
work in. ‘Transformative change’ strikes some of us as the
most far-reaching effective type of change we have ever
observed or experienced. 
Logically, how one goes about trying to engage with
social and political change processes to make them
happen more, less, or differently, should be informed by
how one understands social change as actually happening.
External empowerment and accountability interventions
need to be viewed as coming into a situation in flux, in
which any number of change processes, of any mix of
Reeler’s three types, are ongoing, interwoven with each
other. If the external actor seeks ‘socially progressive’
outcomes, it will want to engage with this fluid field of
change dynamics and help it onwards in a certain
direction. It might do that in a range of ways: by blocking
one particular change process, starting up an entirely new
change process, engaging with a change process
tangentially so as to speed it on its way. 
By implication, to be maximally effective – particularly in
terms of benefiting vulnerable people – the external agent
has to have some more or less well-informed notion of
what change dynamics are going on and what drives and
shapes them, in this place, at this time. S/he has to design
the intervention according to that notion and be prepared
to modify it as the local contemporary change dynamics
unfold – which, if left to their own devices, are probably
more likely to happen in an ‘emergent’ or ‘transformative’
way than in a ‘projectable’ way. 
More attention to context and power analysis The
problem of many development and aid programmes since
aid began is that they are premised on projectable models
of change, attributing to the programme environment
qualities and dynamics that it does not have. Various
remedies for this mismatch between aid programming
and real life have been tried since the early 1990s when a
series of development studies ‘classics’7 made it
increasingly untenable to ignore the mismatch. Transposed
into the field of empowerment and accountability
programming, the mismatch translates into ‘power
blindness’. This blindness consists of a failure to recognise
that what is at stake is the inequitable power relations
between actors, and that both ‘empowerment’ and
‘accountability’ are fundamentally about shifting power
relations in ways that may benefit the programme
beneficiaries but may also disempower those who have
failed to account to them and have benefited from their
powerlessness. Power needs to sit squarely within our
thinking around E&A programmes and the ways we try to
assess their impact must therefore reflect political as well
as technical considerations. 
Shift from assuming attribution to considering
contribution Projectable models of social change
processes have been overplayed especially by aid agencies
needing to show that they can make major contributions
to social change in short periods of time. These actors
need to get better at asking what else besides their
project may have facilitated or hindered change: local
political dynamics? religious fervour? demographic
dynamics? Most development INGO M&E strategies and
systems, including those reviewed as part of this scoping,
have started from the ‘projectable change’ (‘Working with
a plan’) understanding of truth, evidence, knowledge and
reality, rather than grounded contextual understandings
which are closer to the ‘emergent’ understanding (‘We
make our path by walking it’) (Reeler 2007). They need to
shift their focus from seeking attribution (‘What did our
project achieve?’) to considering contribution (‘Has anything
changed and did we have anything to do with it?’). 
The above will require a shift in emphasis from focusing on
indicators, data collection tools and methods, to more
critical thinking about choosing MEL strategies and designs
that enable appropriate exploration of cause and effect
relationships. Those involved in evaluation and impact
assessment of E&A initiatives not only face the challenge
of identifying and assessing meaningful measures of
change. They also need to reflect more on whether INGO
interventions are necessary and/or sufficient – in the
absence of other factors – to explain any social, political
and economic empowerment of different groups of
people observed. They will need to ask whether, and in
what contexts and circumstances, different types of citizen
empowerment leads to meaningful changes in the
responsiveness and institutionalised accountability
behaviours of state actors at different levels, private sector
service providers, and indeed themselves. Developing
approaches and systems to assess these changes is vital if
impact evaluations are to detect and explain the longer-
term effects of programmes on people’s wellbeing. 
In assessing contribution, there is no expectation of
accurate quantification. Instead, shifting the focus to
contribution can be seen as an opportunity for those
working at the frontline to apply their contextual
knowledge to understanding change or lack of it, and
improving programmes in an evolving way that has been
discouraged – if not ‘disallowed’ – in traditional
‘projectable’ results-based approaches to M&E. 
Start evaluation planning earlier Like Stern et al. (2012),
we found a lack of baseline and process monitoring data
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has limited what final evaluations, conducted within time
constraints, can reliably conclude or achieve. This suggests
an urgent need to start developing MEL strategies earlier
in the programme’s life – at the design stage.
Less data and more real-time analysis Recent comments
by DFID evaluation specialists, Nick York and Caroline
Hoy, on Oxfam GB’s attempts to measure its effectiveness
are telling.8 They caution against investing time and effort
in collecting and analysing lots of quantitative data using
counterfactuals in final evaluations when other approaches
to understanding change may be more appropriate. 
‘One key (Oxfam GB) assumption is that by doing more
work and collecting more data… from comparison sites…
they will be able to understand and demonstrate impact.
Actually, based on discussions we have had… recently in
DFID, we have started to ask a different sort of question.
In some types of programmes, more data and more work
may not be the solution – more innovative methods and
approaches to understanding impact can be required
and if the programme itself develops as you implement
it then the goal posts are continually shifting too.’9
Improve the quality of analysis and learning Like the
evaluations assessed by Stern et al. (2012) and McGee and
Gaventa (2011), INGO evaluations have tended to be better
at descriptive statistics and generating general lessons than
analysing causal mechanisms and undertaking the type of
learning directed by a ‘theory of change’-based
interrogation. This is not only because of a lack of
monitoring data. Even when such data exists, it is seldom
used for triangulation and interrogation of how and why
results happened. Instead of asking ‘Are we doing things
right?’, we need to ask ‘What do our findings suggest about
our assumptions and theories about how change happens?’ 
Long-term capacity development Given current evaluation
capacity within all parts of the international development
sector, this should be viewed as a medium- to long-term
undertaking that will not have immediate results. Oxfam
GB’s recent reflection on its first effectiveness study, which
concluded it was overambitious, is a lesson to us all:
‘Worth noting, then, that even a large NGO like Oxfam
has serious limits to the capacity we have available for
impact evaluation. The silver bullet is to get an appropriate
balance of investment versus delivery, and to ensure
that external accountability purposes do not outweigh
the potential to use this evidence for learning and
improvement’ (Jennie Richmond, Head of Programme
Performance and Accountability, Oxfam GB).10 
Develop more critical epistemological awareness
Chambers (1998) coined the phrase ‘self-critical
epistemological awareness’, meaning being aware of how
our backgrounds, and the power relations that shape our
positionality, affect our interpretations and constructions
of knowledge. Although there has been some progress,
power relations between aid players (from the grassroots
to institutional funders) mean that admission of weakness
or failure is still rare and methodological discussions are
undervalued or weak. There is a need for self-critical
epistemological awareness to spread so that INGO actors
can nurture organisational cultures that celebrate learning
from admitting challenges or weak practice.
Attitudinal and cultural change Developing NGO
capacity to do better M&E and impact assessment and
real-time learning is about more than developing technical
skills; it will require attitudinal change as well. New
‘quality of evidence’ tools (Bond n.d.) emerging in the
sector suggest a willingness to borrow and learn from
practices more common in applied academic research,
including the routine presentation of a critical discussion
of one’s own methodology. While this is virtually an
indicator of quality in academic research, it is rarely seen
in NGO impact assessments or evaluations. 
These implications should not be perceived as yet more
top-down requirements that make it harder still for
country-based programme staff and partners to report to
headquarters. In many respects, because they invite
realism into the practice of M&E and impact assessment,
they can reduce the tension often felt by country-based
staff and partners between the requirement to comply
with standardising, homogenising results-focused M&E
requirements, and the need to acquit themselves and
their programmes in ways that do justice to the complex
and not entirely manageable realities surrounding them. 
To some extent, INGO efforts to make the shifts
highlighted above are hindered by the tools used by
results-based management-focused donors – for instance,
M&E systems driven by logical framework indicators. In
some instances they are also constrained by decisions the
INGOs have made about their own internal performance
management systems – for example the use of global
indicators (Hughes and Hutchings 2011). 
However, among the evaluations we reviewed we found
some evidence of change in both INGOs and donor
agencies. INGOs increasingly recognise the weaknesses of
‘projectable’ approaches to evaluation driven by logframe
indicators described in terms of effects on numbers of
individual people. Similarly, evaluation staff in donor agencies
like DFID are starting to implement the recommendations
of related reviews that they have commissioned (e.g. Stern et
al. 2012), developing frameworks to identify ‘difficult-to-
measure’ programmes and encouraging NGOs to take more
adaptive learning approaches.11
The scoping we undertook revealed some interesting
designs that indicate the four INGOs are (within some of
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their programmes at least) actively responding to the
issues above (see Box 2). However, given the size and
complexity of the four organisations, they face extreme
time, resource and capacity constraints for pulling
guidelines, recommendations and lessons together so that
they can be implemented consistently in projects carried
out in very different contexts.
Within these studies the NGOs demonstrated examples of
good practice and some capacity to measure changes in:
 knowledge of rights;
 perceptions of relationships between different groups;
 skills acquired; 
 issues solved; and
 access to infrastructure and services resulting from
engagement with state actors. 
In some instances there was validation of these changes
by communities. However, there were weaknesses in
overall analysis – particularly of qualitative data that was
found to be very time-consuming – and efforts to explore
causal mechanisms. Outcomes from theories of change
were used for descriptive rather than explanatory
purposes. In other words, efforts to tease out how and
why changes have occurred and the relative effects of
project interventions compared to other contextual
factors could do with further improvement. It is quite
possible that the issues identified are already beginning to
be addressed. Our scoping revealed increasing investment
in baselines, some informed by detailed context analysis;
the establishment of monitoring systems to support
evaluation and impact assessment earlier in programmes;
and the development of participatory indicators and scalar
tools to aid measurement. Plan and World Vision are
testing theory-based ToC approaches to evaluation. Some
specific examples of current INGO E&A evaluation
initiatives are referred to in appropriate places in the
guidelines produced from the scoping exercise,
summarised below and published in full as CDI Practice
Paper 01 Annex. 
4 Guidelines to improve the evaluability
of E&A programmes
This section summarises guidance that can be followed
when designing MEL strategies and systems capable of
assessing the outcomes and impacts of E&A programmes
and exploring causal mechanisms. As this is an iterative
and non-scientific process, the guidance needs to be
applied differently to programmes according to the values
of organisations, strategic importance of the respective
programme, framing of evaluation objectives and
questions, resources available, programme attributes and
the context of implementation. Set out as a list of
pointers to think about corresponding to stages in the
process, they are intended to assist UK- or country-based
programme managers, M&E staff, those responsible for
commissioning evaluations and impact assessments, and
those who write funding proposals to donors. Some
pointers may suggest the need for external assistance, and
may prove useful in developing terms of reference for this. 
When deciding when to start work on designing a
MEL, impact evaluation or impact assessment system:
 Start early to ensure that opportunities are maximised
for MEL strategies to contribute to real-time learning
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Box 2 Signs of INGO responsiveness to
challenges in M&E of E&A programmes
CARE Bangladesh is piloting an innovative participatory
approach to monitoring and evaluating a livelihoods
programme. The main objective of the M&E system is
community learning to improve programme effectiveness,
but it integrates a statistical analysis of changes in
household assets and income with quantitative analysis of
data gathered from a ‘Most Significant Change’12 approach
to assessing various dimensions of empowerment, some
resulting from enhanced government accountability. 
CARE Peru integrated a quantitative and qualitative
analysis of changes resulting from a community health
surveillance system and integrated it with a participatory
action research project that explored how women
involved in the project experienced empowerment in
public and private spheres.
World Vision Uganda used quantitative and qualitative
methods to pilot test a ‘theory of change’-based
evaluation methodology to assess increases in
knowledge of rights and perceptions of influence over
decisions, in a Citizen Voice and Accountability project.
This evaluation benefits from its attempts to link
learning from assessment of results to the quality of
project implementation, particularly the knowledge and
capacity of NGO staff, which is important but rare in
INGO evaluation practice.
Plan UK was able to produce quantitative data on increases
in access to services across many countries that resulted
from DFID PPA funding. Partly as a result of criticisms
from PPA evaluators that there were not enough
qualitative data to explain the meaning of quantitative
results, it is now doing more work on qualitative analysis
including using tools such as outcome harvesting.
The Mid-Term Review of Christian Aid’s Governance and
Transparency Fund programme, Power to the People,
introduced a generic framework for understanding E&A
change in a meta-evaluation of heterogeneous projects
being implemented in diverse contexts.
to improve the impact and value for money of
programmes, evaluations and impact assessment. 
When deciding on MEL designs, bear in mind:
 INGO organisational values and norms favour participatory
design elements; 
 The current state of evidence on E&A impact and the
complex, unpredictable and long-term nature of E&A
programmes mean experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches, which are expensive, have
limited utility as single designs or indeed as hybrids;
 Theory-based approaches guided by ToCs are the most
appropriate dominant design, though they can be
complemented by participatory elements, surveys or
case studies;
 Design decisions should be influenced by how important
it is to infer causality as compared to understanding
causal mechanisms and dynamics in any given case; 
 Considering particular programme attributes and the
contexts in which they are being implemented helps to
identify specific evaluation challenges and implications
for design;13
 Resource and capability constraints place pragmatic
limitations on the scope of MEL strategies and need to
be considered early on.
When operationalising a MEL strategy:
 Operationalising MEL designs requires choosing which
outputs, milestones towards outcomes and – if
appropriate – impacts will be identified and assessed in
a given timeframe;
 Decisions need to be taken about trade-offs between
local utility and standardisation for donors; 
 Sample designs need to take into account
demographics and power relations at different levels; 
 Choices of measurement tools need to be guided by
programme attributes and consideration of how
different tools and triangulation approaches are likely to
enable interrogation of ToC assumptions;
 Quality is often more important than quantity when
thinking about indicators, sample designs and
measurement tools;
 Check to ensure statistical analysis techniques for ordinal
scoring data are valid if they are being considered;
 Make sure qualitative approaches consider the
associated costs of translation and analysis.
When implementing the programme and the MEL strategy:
 Plan an inception workshop to iron out the details of the
MEL operational plan, including roles and responsibilities;
 Develop protocols with adequate capacity development
for those involved in implementing the plan;
 In addition to planning a final evaluation, ensure
resources are available for periodically revisiting ToCs,
interrogating assumptions, analysing contributions with
reference to context, and adapting programmes in the
light of learning.
When reviewing or writing MEL reports or writing
self-critical appraisal of own methodology: 
 Make evident how, when and why evaluation decisions
were taken, for example design, sample size, approach
to analysis;
 Discuss limitations, doubts, and the positionality or bias
of the researchers;
 Ensure conclusions use findings to assess the validity of
assumptions and ToCs, and discuss the implications for
the programme in question and other practitioners.
5 Conclusion
The review found that the four INGOs engaged in this
project are already improving the evaluability of
empowerment and accountability programmes in order to
enhance accountability and learning at different levels in
complex aid relationships. 
The very nature and complexity of E&A programmes
together with the relatively weak evaluation capacity within
the international development sector suggests this is going
to be a long-term project. Improving the evaluability and
assessment of the outcomes of such programmes in large,
complex, international organisations trying to decentralise
power and work in partnership to shift rather than
entrench power inequalities, is an extremely difficult task. 
Getting it ‘right’ – or righter – is going to require
investments of time, attention and funding in the short to
medium term, to shift the current INGO organisational
capacity, organisational self-expectations, and expectations
of institutional donors operating in an evidence-based
paradigm, onto a different level. It requires taking a more
integrated approach – informed by complexity science –
to evaluation strategy design, in which final evaluations or
impact assessments are no longer discrete activities, but
part of a longer learning process. Such holistic designs
may call for radical rethinking of ‘independent evaluation’
and relationships between consultant evaluators and
insiders. For example, contracting the same consultants to
help with initial designs as with final evaluations – an
approach some donors are piloting – could improve the
quality of analysis and final evaluation. 
Given that resources are constrained, strategic thinking
about how and where to invest these are urgent on the
INGOs’ side, and realistic and strategic adjustments of
expectations would be welcome on the institutional
donors’ side. As many donors are realising, funders anxious
to demonstrate the effectiveness of their spending do
nobody any favours by pushing INGOs into producing data
that lack meaning. They do everyone favours by working
with these INGOs to resource their MEL capacity
strategically, proportionately to need, and in keeping with
cost–benefit considerations. One related question arising
from recent literature on impact evaluation is whether
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donors should be asking INGOs implementing ‘demand-
side’ empowerment and accountability programmes to
evaluate their ‘impact’ on the lives of individuals
independently of complementary supply-side governance
capacity-building initiatives. Approaches that ‘nest’ INGO
evaluations within broader donor governance portfolios
that value and aim to explore causal links between INGO
contributions and the development of diverse civil
societies, rather than encouraging them to make tenuous
claims in terms of their impacts on the lives of individual
people, may be a more appropriate strategy. 
These recommendations offer neither prescriptions nor
magic bullets. They should be seen as a contribution to
ongoing discussions amongst practitioners who are working
hard to enable their agencies to respond to new evaluation
challenges. By engaging with evaluation dilemmas early on
in programme conceptualisation it should be possible to
select designs and methods that are cost-effective and
appropriate for assessing change given the strategic
importance of the interventions; their attributes and
theories of change underpinning them; the resources and
capabilities available; and organisational values.  
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Notes
1 Reference is made in this paper, especially Section 3, to some of
these examples reviewed. Their full bibliographic details are
provided in the companion CDI Practice Paper 01 Annex. Some
are internal INGO documents that are not publicly available. 
2 From the terms of reference of the Stern et al. (2012) study. 
3 The Transparency and Accountability Initiative (T/A Initiative) is a
donor collaborative committed to strengthening democracy and
development through empowering citizens to hold their governing
institutions to account. Its members are DFID, Ford Foundation,
Hivos, International Budget Partnership, Omidyar Network, Open
Society Institute, Revenue Watch Institute, and William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation. For the outputs of the mentioned review,
see www.transparency-initiative.org/ workstream/impact-learning.
4 Shutt and McGee (2012).
5 Examples of how some of these designs have been used in E&A
programmes can be found in the IETA review by McGee and
Gaventa (2010).
6 Further details can be found in Shutt (2010).
7 For example, Chambers’s Rural Development: Putting the Last First
(1983), Rondinelli’s Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An
Adaptive Approach to Development Administration (1993) and
Porter et al.’s Development in Practice: Paved with Good
Intentions (1991).
8 www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=12254 (accessed 27 February 2013).
9 Ibid.
10 http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2012/10/ effectiveness-
reviews (accessed 27 February 2013).
11 DFID Investment Committee Paper: Workstream on Harder to
Measure Benefits and Results, Discussion Note for meeting,
15 November 2012.
12 See Davies and Dart (2005).
13 A tool can be found in the companion CDI Practice Paper 01
Annex.
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(1) Exploring a broader range of evaluation designs and
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“If international NGOs are to successfully ‘measure’ or assess outcomes andimpacts of empowerment and accountability programmes, they need to shift attentionfrom tools and methods to developing more holistic and complexity-informed evaluation
strategies during programme design. This will require investments of time, attention
and funding in the short to medium term, to shift the current INGO organisational
capacity, organisational self-expectations, and expectations of institutional donors
operating in an evidence-based paradigm, onto a different level.”
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